Continuing with readings from keynote speakers at our upcoming conference, next up are two short papers from Uljana Feest.
“Husserl’s Crisis as a Crisis of Psychology” (2012) Studies in History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences 43: 493–503.
“Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data” (2014) Philosophy of Science 81: 927–939.
The first addresses Husserl’s (1936) The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology as it relates to experimental psychology in particular, with a focus on Husserl’s relationship to Brentano. It also develops one of the themes of the last few readings, the role of naturalism in psychology and philosophy.
The second analyzes the role of first-personal methods in psychology with a special focus on the debate between the gestalt psychologists and the Wundt school of psychological atomism (which Köhler and others referred to as “introspectionist”). It tackles the vexing question of whether methods for studying phenomenal experience are inherently “phenomenological,” and if not, what the contrast between phenomenological and non-phenomenological methods might be.
As always, if you have trouble accessing the readings, please contact the moderators.